Abstract. By applying an equilibrium existence theorem for a qualitative game due to Ding and Tan and by employing an "approximation" method used by Tulcea, we obtain an equilibrium existence theorem for an abstract economy (generalized game) in which the constraint correspondences are not assumed to have open graphs nor open lower sections (which are generally assumed in the literature). Our result generalizes the corresponding results of Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) , Borglin and Keiding (1976) , Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983) , Tulcea (1986), and Chang (1990) in several ways.
Introduction
Let F be a vector space and A c E. We shall denote by co A the convex hull of A. If A is a subset of a topological space X, the closure of A in X is denoted by cl^ A and the interior of A in X is denoted by int^(^i). Also, A is said to be compactly open in X if, for each nonempty compact subset C of X, A n C is open in C. Let X be a set; we shall denote by 2X the family of all subsets of X. Let X and Y be sets and F : X -* 2Y . Then the graph of F , denoted by Graph(F), is the set {(x, y) £ X xY : y £ F(x)} . Suppose Our notions of correspondences being of class Lec , L^ c-majorant of $ at x, and Lg t c-majorized generalize the corresponding notions of correspondences being of class L, ^-majorantof <p at x,and Jz^-majorizedintroduced by Yannelis and Prabhakar [10, p. 240] . As in [4] , we shall only deal with either the case (I) X = Y and is a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space and 6 = lx , the identity map on X, or the case (II) X = Y[ieI X¡ and 6 = n}■■ : X -► Xj is the projection of X onto X¡ and Xj = Y is a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space. In both cases (I) and (II), we shall write Lc in place of Lex ■ A one-person game is a quadruple (X ; A, B ; P) where X is a topological space, A, B : X -» 2X are constraint correspondences, and F : X -» 2* is a preference correspondence. An equilibrium point for (AT ; ¿4, 5 ; P) is a point x* € X such that x* € B(x") and ^(x*) n P(x*) = 0.
Let / be a (finite or infinite) set of agents (players). An abstract economy (generalized game) is a family T = (X¡ ; A¡, B¡ ; F,),e/ of quadruples (X¡ ; A¡, Ai ; F,) where, for each i £ I, X¡ is a topological space, A¡, B¡ : X := YljeI Xj -* 2Xi are constraint correspondences, and F, : X -+ 2*< is a preference correspondence. An equilibrium point for T is a point x* £ X such that, for each i £ I, x* = 7r,(x*) € ß,(x*) and ^,(x*) n P¡(x*) = 0 where 7T,: : X -> Xi is the projection. We remark that when B~¡(x*) = cLy,. .B,-(x*) (which is the case when B¡ has a closed graph in X x X¡, in particular, when clx, 5, is upper semicontinuous with closed values) for each i £ I our definition of an equilibrium point for an abstract economy (generalized game) coincides with that of [4] . Also, according to Gale and Mas-Colell [5] , a qualitative game is a family Y = (X¡, F,),e/ of ordered pairs (X¡, P¡) where, for each i £ I, X¡ is a topological space and P¡ : X = ]~lj€¡ Xj -> 2Xi is an irreflexive preference correspondence, i.e., x, £ F,(x) for all x £ X. A point x* £ X is said to be an equilibrium point of the qualitative game T if P¡(x*) = 0 for all i £ I.
In this paper we first prove one useful lemma. Next by applying an equilibrium existence theorem for a qualitative game due to Ding and Tan [4] and by employing an "approximation" method used by Tulcea [8] , we obtain an equilibrium existence theorem for an abstract economy (generalized game). Our results generalize the corresponding results of Chang [3] , Yannelis and Prab-haker [10] , Borglin and Keiding [2] , Shafer and Sonnenschein [7] , and Tulcea [8] in several ways.
Preliminaries
We shall need the following simple result. Lemma 2.1. Let X be a topological space, Y a nonempty subset of a topological vector space E, 38 a base for the zero neighborhoods in E, and B : X -* 2Y. Lemma 2.2. Let X be a nonempty paracompact convex subset of a topological vector space and P : X -> 2X Lc-majorized. Suppose that there exist a nonempty compact convex subset Xo of X and a nonempty compact subset K of X such that for each y £ X\K there is an x £ co(X0U{y}) with x £ co P(y). Then there exists an x £ K such that P(x) = 0. (ii) For each i £ I, P, : X -► 2Xi is Lc-majorized.
(iii) U,6/{* € X : Pi(x) ¿0} = U;e/ intA-{x £ X : F,(x) # 0} .
(iv) There exist a nonempty compact convex subset Xo of X and a nonempty compact subset K of X such that for each y £ X\K there is an x £ co(A'oU{y}) with x, £ co P¡(y) for all i £ I.
Then T has an equilibrium point in K.
Equilibrium points
In this section we shall use the approximation technique used by Tulcea [8] to obtain equilibrium existence theorems for abstract economies. First we shall prove the following existence theorem of "approximate" equilibrium points for a one-person game. Theorem 3.1. Let X be a nonempty paracompact convex subset of a topological vector space E and A, B, P : X -* 2X be such that (i) A is lower semicontinuous and, for each x £ X, A(x) is nonempty and coA(x) c B(x);
(ii) A n P is Lc-majorized; (iii) there exist a nonempty compact convex subset Xo of X and a nonempty compact subset K of X such that, for each y £ X\K, co(X0 u {y}) n co(A(y) n P(y)) * 0.
Then for each open convex neighborhood V of zero in E the one-person game (X ; A, Bv ; F) has an equilibrium point in K ; i.e., there exists a point xv £ K such that Xv £ ~By(xy) and A(xv)nP(xy) = 0 where Bv(x) = (B(x) + V)nX for each x £ X. Therefore, 4V is an Lc-majorized correspondence. Moreover by (iii), for each y £ X\K, there exists x £ co(AT0 U {y}) n co(A(y) n P(y)), so x € co(A(y) n P(y)) c co^viy).
Thus by Lemma 2.2 there exists x £ K such that *¥y(x) = 0. Since ^(x) / 0 by (i), we must have x e By(x) and A(x)nP(x) = 0. a
In the proof of Theorem 3.1, we obtained an equilibrium point of a oneperson game as a maximal element of a binary relation. This idea is originated from Aliprantis and Brown [1] .
The following is an existence of an "approximate" equilibrium point for an abstract economy. Theorem 3.2. Let I be any (finite or infinite) set. For each i £ I, let X¡ be a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space E¡ and A¡, B¡, P,■ : X = n;e/ Xj -» 2X' be such that (a) Ai is lower semicontinuous and, for each x £ X, A¡(x) is nonempty and co Ai(x) C B¡(x) ; (b) Ai n Pi is Lc-majorized; (c) the set E' = {x £ X : (A¡ n F,)(x) # 0} is open in X. Suppose that X is paracompact and that there exist a nonempty compact convex subset Xo of X and a nonempty compact subset K of X such that for each y £ X\K there is an x £ co(AT0 U {y}) with x¡ £ co(A¡(y) n P¡(y)) for all (e) There exist a nonempty compact convex subset An of X and a non-empty compact subset K of X such that for each y £ X\K there is an x £ co(AoU{y}) with x, e co(Aj(y) n P¡(y)) for all i £ I. with Xi £ co(A¡(y) n P¡(y)) for all i£ I. Then 3? has an equilibrium point in K ; i.e., there exists a point x e K such that, for each i£ I, x¡ £ B~¡(x) and A¡(x) n F,(x) = 0.
Proof. By (c), the map A,■ : X -* 2Xi is lower semicontinuous and the set E' = {x £ X : A¡(x) n F,(x) ^ 0} is open in X. Therefore, all the hypotheses in Theorem 3.3 are satisfied, so the conclusion follows. D Corollary 3.4 (and hence also Theorem 3.3) improves Theorem 6.1 of Yannelis and Prabhakar [10] in the following ways:
(i) the index set / need not be countable; (ii) for each i £ I, the set X¡ need not be metrizable; (iii) for each i £ I, A¡D P¡ need not be L-majorized. with Xi £ co(Ai(y) n P¡(y)) for all i£l.
Then & has an equilibrium point in K, i.e., there exists a point x £ X such that, for each i £ I, x¡ £ B¡(x) and A¡(x) n F,(x) = 0.
Proof. For each i £ I, since A¡ has an open graph in X x X¡ (respectively, is lower semicontinuous) and F, is lower semicontinuous (respectively, has open graph in X x Xi), the map A¡ DP,-: X -> 2Xi is also lower semicontinuous by 
